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Abstract—Digital speech copyright protection and forgery 
identification are the prevalent issues in our advancing digital 
world. In speech forgery, voiced part of the speech signal is 
copied and pasted to a specific location which alters the meaning 
of the speech signal. Watermarking can be used to safe guard the 
copyrights of the owner. To detect copy-move forgeries a 
transform domain watermarking method is proposed. In the 
proposed method, watermarking is achieved through Discrete 
Cosine Transform (DCT) and Quantization Index Modulation 
(QIM) rule. Hash bits are also inserted in watermarked voice 
segments to detect Copy-Move Forgery (CMF) in speech signals. 
Proposed method is evaluated on two databases and achieved 
good imperceptibility. It exhibits robustness in detecting the 
watermark and forgeries against signal processing attacks such as 
resample, low-pass filtering, jittering, compression and cropping. 
The proposed work contributes for forensics analysis in speech 
signals. This proposed work also compared with the some of the 
state-of-art methods.  
 
Keywords—watermarking, copy-move forgery, Discrete Cosine 
Transform, Quantization Index Modulation, Hash bits 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ITH rapid strides in multimedia technology leads to 
easy access and transmission of multimedia content. 
This creates a demand for ownership authentication and 
forgery detection of the same. A well-known and traditional 
way of solution for this problem is watermarking [1], [2]. It is 
the process of embedding ownership information as a 
watermark into a speech signal. This information is further 
extracted to claim the authentication. If watermark information 
directly embedded into signal samples then that type of 
techniques are called time domain techniques [3], [4], [5]. If 
watermark is inserted into transform coefficients then those are 
called transform domain techniques [6], [7], [8]. Transform 
domain techniques are more robust than the other one.  
M. A. Nematollahi et.al., [9] proposed a semi-fragile and 
blind speech watermarking technique based on the Discrete 
Wavelet Packet Transform (DWPT) and QIM. In this paper, 
watermark is embedded within an angle of the wavelet’s sub-
bands. Same authors in [10], proposed a robust speech 
watermarking technique based on DWPT. Here watermark 
embeds in the amplitudes of the wavelet’s sub-band. S. Wang 




N.V.Lalitha is with the Dept. of Electronics and Communication 
Engineering, GMR Institute of Technology, Rajam, A.P, India (e-mail: 
lalitha.nv@gmrit.edu.in).  
Ch.Srinivasa Rao is with the Dept. of Electronics and Communication 
Engineering, JNTU-K University, Vizianagaram, A.P, India (e-
mail:chsrao.ece@jntukucev.ac.in). 
P.V.Y.Jayasree is with the Dept. of Electronics and Communication 
Engineering, GIT, GITAM University, Visakhapatnam, A.P, India (e-mail: 
pvyjayasree@gitam.edu). 
DCT (DDCT) and QIM. Authors claim that this technique 
provides satisfactory robustness and tamper resistance. M. A. 
Nematollahi et.al., [12] presented a blind speech watermarking 
based on Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) and Singular 
Value Decomposition (SVD). Here, speech signal is divided 
into frames and applied DWT then SVD to compute eigen 
values of approximation coefficients. Authors reported that 
this work is robust against attacks. In [13], authors proposed a 
synchronized blind speech watermarking based on two-level 
DWT and Adaptive Mean Modulation (AMM). Here, 
watermark bits and synchronized bits are embedded in selected 
second level detail and approximation sub-bands using AMM 
method.    
Most of these works concentrate on watermarking process 
and are robust to signal processing attacks but cannot detect 
Copy-Move Forgery (CMF). In speech CMF, voiced part of 
the speech signal is copied and pasted to a specific location 
which alters the meaning of the speech signal. To address this 
problem, in the proposed method, speech signal is divided into 
voice segments to embed the watermark. Hash bits are 
generated and inserted in that watermarked voice segments 
which made the method novel in detecting the CMF. 
Watermark is useful for copyright protection purpose and hash 
bits are useful for forgery detection.  
The paper organization is as follows. Materials and Methods 
are discussed in section II. Methodology of the proposed work 
is discussed in section III. Experiment results and discussion 
about the work is given in section IV. Conclusions of this work 
are reported in section V. 
II. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
In this proposed method, speech signal is transformed by using 
DCT and QIM technique is used for watermark insertion. 
These are discussed in this section. 
A. Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) 
DCT transformation is used in this work to convert the signal 
from spatial to frequency domain. DCT [14] transformation 
decomposes the signal into series of cosine harmonics and it is 
computationally simple than FFT. One dimensional DCT 
transformation of signal 𝑓(𝑥) and inverse DCT transformation 
of  𝐷(𝑛) are shown in Equation (1) and Equation (2). 
 
𝐷(𝑛) = 𝛽(𝑛)∑ 𝑓(𝑥) cos [
𝜋(2𝑥+1)𝑛
2𝑁
]  ,    𝑛 = 0,1,2,…𝑁 − 1 𝑁−1𝑥=0       (1) 
 
𝑓(𝑥) = ∑ 𝛽(𝑛)𝐷(𝑛)𝑐𝑜𝑠 [
𝜋(2𝑥+1)𝑛
2𝑁












,     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛 = 0
                         (3) 
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B. Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) 
In this QIM [15] method, watermark is inserted into the signal 
by changing the quantizers shown in Equation (4). This 
method produces high imperceptibility and robustness to 
amplitude-related attacks.  
 
𝑒𝑚𝑖 = 𝑓𝑄(𝑠𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖 , ∅)                           (4) 
 
Where, 𝑓𝑄 is the quantization modulation function, 𝑠𝑖 is the 
host signal, 𝑤𝑖  is the watermark, ∅ is the quantization strength 
and 𝑒𝑚𝑖 is the embedded signal. 
In extraction process, watermark is extracted by using below 
Equation (5)  
 
𝑒𝑤 = {
1,     𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑄(𝑒𝑚𝑖
′, ∅) > 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
0,                                       𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                               (5) 
Where, gQ is the quantization demodulation function, emi
′ is 
the watermarked signal and ew is extracted watermark. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
In this proposed work, speech signal is divided to voiced 
segments. For each segment, N X N size pre-processed 
watermark is embedded to protect the speech signal for 
unauthorized claiming. Hash bits also generated to each voiced 
segment and inserted into the binary form of speech segment 
for detection and identification of CMF 
A. Watermark embedding process 
N X N size binary watermark image is used for embedding 
process. This watermark is preprocessed using Gaussian map 
[16] chaotic encryption for increasing the security to the 
watermark. Gaussian chaotic map is defined below Equation 
(6) and Equation (7). 
 
𝑃𝑖+1 = exp(−𝜑𝑃𝑖
2) + 𝜎                          (6) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑖  is the initial value in the range 0 and 1, and 𝜑,  𝜎 are 
real parameters. 
𝑔𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑖 > 1/4
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
                         (7) 
This 𝑔𝑖 binary sequence is EX-OR with watermark binary 
sequence to get encrypted sequence 𝑒𝑖.  
N X N size encrypted watermark is embedded into DCT 
coefficients of each voiced segment based on QIM rule shown 












,   𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑖 = 1
   𝑖 = 1,2,……𝑁 × 𝑁    (8) 
Where, 𝑎𝑠𝑖  is the sample of the transformed voice segment, ∅ 
is embedding strength and 𝑒𝑚𝑖 is embedded coefficient. 
This multiple embedding of watermark is useful in 
extraction of watermark from attacked speech signal. Due to 
attack, any segment is corrupted then watermark cannot be 
recovered properly, hence watermark can be extracted from 
any other segment. Generate 128-bit hash [17] for each 
watermarked segment and insert those bits into binary form of 
same watermarked segment for forgery detection. This process 
is repeated for all voice segments and it is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
  
Fig. 1. Watermark and Hash embedding flow 
B. Watermark extraction process 
In extraction process, divide the incoming forged speech signal 
into voice segments. Extract the encrypted watermark from the 
DCT coefficients of speech segment using QIM extraction rule 











0,                                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                   (9) 
 
Where, 𝑎𝑠𝑖
′ is the 𝑖𝑡ℎ transformed coefficient of the incoming 
forged speech signal and 𝑒𝑖
′ are the extracted bits. These bits 
are further decrypted by inverse Gaussian map to get extracted 
watermark. BER is calculated to this extracted watermark and 
original watermark. This watermark extraction process is 
applied to each segment and which segment got minimum 
BER that segment is considered as a valid extracted 
watermark. Hence, watermark is extracted from all segments 
and low BER for extracted watermark validates the watermark. 
This watermark extraction flow is shown in Fig.2. 
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C. CMF detection and identification process 
In this process, forged speech signal is divided to voice 
segments and converted into binary samples. Recover the 128 
bit hash from those binary samples and this process is repeated 
for all segments. Recovered hash bits are compared with other 
segment hash bits using BER. If calculated BER is less than 
the predefined threshold then those two corresponding 
segments are identified as copy-move forged segments, 
otherwise incoming speech signal is considered as no forgery 
signal. This process flow is shown in below Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Watermark Extraction and CMF identification process 
IV. EXPERIMENT RESULTS 
The proposed method is tested on two datasets i. VoxForge 
database [18] of 4 seconds and ii. Speech signals of 10 
seconds. Second dataset is developed by recording voice 
articulated by male, female and child in three different 
languages. All are .wav, mono, 44.1 KHz sampling frequency 
and 16-bit quantization speech signals. 64 X 64 binary image 
is considered as watermark and it is encrypted using Gaussian 
map. Fig.3 illustrates original watermark image and its 
encrypted version.  
To measure the imperceptibility of the proposed work 
metric SNR is calculated based on the Equation (10) shown 
below.  
 
𝑆𝑁𝑅 = 10 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
∑ 𝑠2(𝑛)𝐿𝑛=1
∑ (𝑠(𝑛)−𝑠′(𝑛))2𝐿𝑛=1
]                     (10) 
  
Where, 𝐿 is the speech length, 𝑠(𝑛) is the original speech and 
𝑠′(𝑛) is the speech after embedding watermark and Hash bits. 
SNR values of 21 speech signals (SS_1 to SS_21) after 




Fig. 3. Watermark image and its encrypted image 
 
Average SNR is 46.0633 dB and it is >20 dB (as per IFPI 
requirement). This SNR is comparatively high when compared 
with [19], [6], [20], [21] and [22]. SNR of a speech signal is 
varied with respective to embedding quantization strength and 




Fig. 4. Plot for SNR Vs embedding quantization strength for a signal 
 
SNR and capacity of this proposed method for two different 
length signals given in Table II. If length of the signal is 
increased, capacity decreases because same size of watermark 
(64 X 64) is embedded in both the signals. In this proposed 
method, watermark is embedded in the voiced segments only 
because of this reason; SNR of 4 sec speech signal got more 
compared to 10 sec speech signal. 
Original speech signal and its separated voice segments are 
shown in Fig. 5a and Fig. 5b respectively. In this example 
voice segment S3 is copied and pasted in place of segment S7 
shown in Fig. 5c. This copied and pasted voice segments are 















SNR Vs Quantization step
 TABLE I  










SS_1 45.724 SS_8 46.0839 SS_15 43.3783 
SS_2 43.3886 SS_9 40.737 SS_16 55.3804 
SS_3 39.1009 SS_10 35.5507 SS_17 53.8065 
SS_4 46.324 SS_11 47.7097 SS_18 51.7504 
SS_5 43.0961 SS_12 37.6553 SS_19 59.8948 
SS_6 42.3989 SS_13 45.4921 SS_20 55.4633 
SS_7 35.7496 SS_14 41.88 SS_21 46.3054 
 
TABLE I 
[TABLE TITLE] TABLE NAME 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 a 
xx1 yyy1 zzz1 
xxx2 yy2 zzz2 
xxx3 yyy3 zz3 
xxx4 yy4 zzzzz4 
xxx5 yyyyy5 zz5 
a[Footnote Text] Content. 
 
 TABLE II 
SNR AND CAPACITY OF THE TWO DIFFERENT LENGTH SPEECH SIGNALS 
Signal duration 4 sec 10 sec 
SNR (dB) 53.7668 42.2846 




[TABLE TITLE] TABLE NAME 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 a 
xx1 yyy1 zzz1 
xxx2 yy2 zzz2 
xxx3 yyy3 zz3 
xxx4 yy4 zzzzz4 
xxx5 yyyyy5 zz5 
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Fig. 5. Original speech signal, forged speech and detected voice segments 
 
The performance of the proposed work is tested on some 
signal processing attacks and descriptions of these attacks are 
given below. 
a. Without attack (W_A): without any signal processing 
attack, watermark is extracted. 
b.  Resampling (R): original speech signal sampling 
 
frequency is 44.1 KHz. In this attack, signal is 
sampled to half of the original frequency and 
resampled back. 
c. Low-pass filtering (LPF_1): signal is passed through 
10 KHz cut-off frequency low-pass filter. 
d. Low-pass filtering (LPF_2): signal is passed through 
16 KHz cut-off frequency low-pass filter. 
e. Jittering (J): removing of one sample among one lakh 
samples. 
f. MP3 Compression (MP3_1): signal is compressed 
with 256 Kbps and back to .wav. 
g. MP3 Compression (MP3_2): signal is compressed 
with 160 Kbps and back to .wav. 
h. Cropping (C_1): starting 1000 samples of the signal 
are replaced with zeros. 
i. Cropping (C_2): middle 1000 samples of the signal 
are replaced with zeros. 
j. Cropping (C_3): ending 1000 samples of the signal 
are replaced with zeros. 
The robustness of the proposed work on the attacked signals 
are evaluated with BER metric and is measured based on the 
below equation. These BER values listed in Table III.  
 
𝐵𝐸𝑅 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠





W_A R LPF_1 LPF_2 J MP3_1 MP3_2 C_1 C_2 C_3 
SS_1 0 0.0004 0.3483 0.0744 0 0 0.0075 0 0 0 
SS_2 0 0.0012 0.4670 0.1106 0 0.0009 0.0473 0 0 0 
SS_3 0 0 0.1601 0.0051 0 0 0.0002 0 0 0 
SS_4 0 0 0.3325 0.0771 0 0 0.0046 0 0 0 
SS_5 0 0 0.3359 0.0949 0 0 0.0109 0 0 0 
SS_6 0 0 0.2644 0.0605 0 0 0.0163 0 0 0 
SS_7 0 0 0.1359 0.0417 0.3527 0 0.0004 0 0 0 
SS_8 0 0 0.3015 0.0715 0 0 0.0051 0 0 0 
SS_9 0 0 0.3457 0.1418 0 0.0002 0.0097 0 0 0 
SS_10 0 0 0.2570 0.0073 0 0 0.0024 0 0 0 
SS_11 0 0 0.3681 0.0949 0 0 0.0046 0 0 0 
SS_12 0 0 0.4511 0.2722 0 0.0021 0.1909 0 0 0 
SS_13 0 0 0.3732 0.1347 0 0.0009 0.0866 0 0 0 
SS_14 0 0 0.4047 0.2426 0.0004 0.0017 0.1010 0 0 0 
SS_15 0 0 0.4152 0.2897 0 0.0034 0.2346 0 0 0 
SS_16 0 0.0126 0.4863 0.4362 0 0.0341 0.3549 0 0 0 
SS_17 0 0.1674 0.4565 0.4494 0 0.0546 0.4638 0.0097 0 0 
SS_18 0 0.0378 0.4973 0.3859 0 0.0285 0.2695 0 0 0 
SS_19 0 0.1901 0.4282 0.4211 0.4465 0.1301 0.4956 0 0 0 
SS_20 0 0.0087 0.4755 0.4597 0.4643 0.0090 0.2690 0 0 0 
SS_21 0 0.0498 0.4875 0.4775 0.4542 0.0292 0.3852 0 0 0 
 
 
This proposed method has able to detect copy-move forged 
voice segments. This method is also tested against the same 
signal processing attacks which are mentioned above. 
Recovered hash bits in each voice segment are compared with 
remaining voice segments using metric BER. If BER is less 
than the predefined threshold value then those corresponding 
segments are considered as CMF segments otherwise 
considered as forgery has not occurred. Table IV shows the 
CMF segments are detected or not for signal processing 
attacks. If forgery is identified then ‘Yes’ is reported 




 TABLE III 
BER VALUES OF EXTRACTED WATERMA1 




[TABLE TITLE] TABLE NAME 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 a 
xx1 yyy1 zzz1 
xxx2 yy2 zzz2 
xxx3 yyy3 zz3 
xxx4 yy4 zzzzz4 
xxx5 yyyyy5 zz5 
a[Footnote Text] Content. 
 






W_A R LPF_1 LPF_2 J MP3_1 MP3_2 C_1 C_2 C_3 
SS_1 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_2 Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_3 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_4 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_5 Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_7 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_8 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_9 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_10 Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_11 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_12 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_13 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_14 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_15 Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_16 Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_17 Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_18 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_19 Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
SS_20 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SS_21 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SP22 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
It is evident from the Table IV, that the proposed method is 
resilient to all post-processing attacks except attacks jittering 
and MP3 compression.   
SNR, Capacity and BER of the proposed method is compared 






In this paper, a transform based speech watermarking using 
DCT and QIM is proposed. Proposed method can provide 
copyright protection and detect CMF. Hash bits are inserted in 
watermarked voice segments to make the proposed method to 
detect CMF in speech signals. Watermark is useful for 
copyright protection purpose and hash bits are useful for 
forgery detection. Experimental results shows that the 
proposed method achieved good imperceptibility and 
robustness against signal processing attacks viz., resample, 
low-pass filtering, jittering, compression and cropping. As 
well, this method can detect CMF in the presence of signal 
processing attacks. The proposed work can be adopted for 
forensics analysis in speech signals.  
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